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DISCLOSURE OF FINANCE CHARGES: 
A RATIONALE 
Robert L. J.ordan and William D. Warren* 
~ 
FOR the better part of the past decade much of the energy of those interested in consumer credit legislation has been expended in 
debating the problem of fair disclosure of finance charges. While 
those who have studied the subject concede that full disclosure of 
finance charges does not offer a solution to some of the most basic 
problems besetting the credit consumer today, the issue of fair dis-
closure of finance charges has still become a rallying point for con-
sumers and a battle line for industry. Consumers demand the right 
to be told what they are paying for credit in terms that they can 
understand. Industry disclaims the motive of wishing to conceal the 
amount of finance charges and asserts that its principal activity 
should be selling credit, not calculating finance charges. To most 
consumer representatives, full disclosure means time rate disclosure. 
To some industry representatives, the requirement of time rate dis-
. closure in every transaction is totally infeasible. 
One wonders whether in all of the talk generated about disclo- · 
sure in the past few years the purposes of disclosing finance charges 
to consumers have not been somewhat obscured. This article is an 
attempt to examine the subject of disclosure from the standpoint of 
the function it performs in consumer credit transactions. We shall 
discuss the various methods of computing finance charges in the dif-
ferent segments of the finance industry, the functions of disclosure 
of finance charges and the feasibility of using different computa-
tional methods in each category of consumer transactions. The prob-
lems involved in _requiring the disclosure of finance charges are not 
as simple as one is sometimes led to believe. Each side of the con-
troversy has good arguments to support its view; neither side is the 
exclusive repository of justice and morality. The problem of re-
quired disclosure has long been debated and is ripe for resolution. 
• The authors are Professors of Law at the University of California, Los Angeles. 
They have served since 1964 as Reporters-Draftsmen of the Consumer Credit Project 
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The opinions 
expressed in this article are their own and are not intended to reflect the views of the 
National Conference or of the Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales, Con-
sumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury.-Ed. 
The authors wish to express their gratitude to Professor Robert W. Johnson, 
Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Purdue University, not only for ad-
vising them on the mathematical aspects of disclosure of finance charges, but also 
for assisting them in· clarifying their thinking in the whole area of disclosure. 
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It is our hope that this article will succeed in pointing out some of 
the factors that should be considered in a compromise legislative 
solution of this thorny problem.1 
I. USE OF COMPUTATIONAL METHODS IN DIFFERENT 
SEGMENTS OF THE FINANCE INDUSTRY 
One generally tends to identify certain methods of computation 
with particular segments of the finance industry. A credit union will 
normally quote a finance charge in terms of a fixe~ per cent per 
month on the unpaid balance of the debt. Many small-loan compa-
nies are required by law to calculate and quote the finance charge 
as a graduated monthly rate, for example three per cent on the first 
$100, two per cent on the next $400 and one per cent on the debt 
in excess of $500. Sales finance companies normally give the con-
sumer a statement of the dollar amount of the finance charge, but 
may advertise their charges as a rate expressed as so many dollars for 
each $100 of the original debt for each year the debt is outstanding. 
Commercial ,banks usually express their finance charges as an annual 
percentage interest rate but discount the loan, that is, deduct the 
interest charge from the amount loaned. 
I. Small loan transactions. Per cent per month on the declining 
balance was adopted by statute as the method of computation appli-
cable to the legitimate small loans industry at the time of its birth 
and early growth under the leadership of the Russell Sage Founda-
tion. This method had previously been adopted by the borrower-
oriented credit unions, and was deemed to be most fair to borrowers 
because finance charges were computed each month and were based 
solely upon the loan balance outstanding at that time.2 In addition, 
I. By way of a scope note, it should be made clear that the objectivo of this article 
is to discuss whether time rate disclosure of finance charges in consumer transactions 
is desirable, and, if so, in what kinds of transactions it is appropriate. There arc other 
substantial problems in the area of disclosure of finance charges that we have not 
attempted to treat in this article. Among these are: (1) how is a consumer transaction 
defined? (2) How is a finance charge defined? Should it include other charges incident 
to the granting of the credit, such as credit life insurance and credit accident and 
health insurance? (3) At what point of time should disclosure of finance charges be 
made, pre-contract or post-contract? What bearing should the nature of the trans-
action (telephone sale, catalogue sale, add-on sale, consumer letter of credit loan) have 
on this question? (4) What disclosure requirements should be made for such re• 
financing transactions as "rewrites" and extensions? (5) How can finance charges be 
disclosed in lease transactions that perform the same function as sales? 
2. Under the per cent per month method, the finance charge is computed monthly 
. by multiplying the outstanding balance of the credit by a monthly percentage rate, 
For example, assume that a loan of $120 is made on the first day of the month and 
the monthly rate is 2%, On the first day of the next month, the finance charge for 
the first month is calculated by multiplying 2% by $120, or $2.40. If the statute is 
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the finance charge was all-inclusive; no other charges could be 
made.3 
The supposed advantages to the borrower of the per cent per 
month on declining balance method notwithstanding, there has been 
a pronounced shift toward precomputation in the small loans indus-
based on a thirty-day month, the charge will vary with the length of the month. In 
the previous example, if the first day of the next month came thirty-one days later, 
the finance charge would be 2% X 31/30 X $120. At the end of each month, the 
borrower not only must pay the finance charge but also must make payments to 
reduce the principle. For example, the contract might require that the principal be 
repaid at the rate of $10 per month for twelve months. On this basis, the payment 
due at the end of the first month is $12.40 ($10 principal plus $2.40 finance, charge). 
The payments due at the end of the succeeding eleven months will be progressively 
less because the monthly finance charge is calculated on the basis of outstanding 
principal, which is constantly being reduced. Thus, the finance charge for the second 
month would be $110 x 2%, or $2.20, and for the third month, $100 x 2%, or 
$2.00. Monthly payments are thus unequal in amount. However, credit suppliers may 
adopt a procedure whereby the monthly payment is a constant amount which will 
pay off the principal and finance charges in one year. This, in fact, is the most 
commonly used method. Here, the proportion of the monthly payment allocable to 
finance charge and principal will vary from month to month. The amount applicable 
to finance charge will decrease and the amount applicable to payment on principal 
will increase in successive months. By use of annuity tables we can calculate that, 
with respect to our example, an even payment of $11.35 per month will amortize 
the loan in twelve months. See generally MoRS, CONSUMER CREDIT FINANCE CHARGES: 
RATE INFORMATION AND QUOTATION 15 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Moas]. 
The per cent per month method has certain advantages. It makes it unnecessary 
to make any adjustment for late payments or for prepayments. The debtor pays a 
finance charge only for the actual number of days the principal is outstanding. In the 
case of the unequal monthly payment system, if the monthly payment is made early 
the finance charge will be less. If the payment is made late, the finance charge will 
be greater. In the case of the equal monthly payment system, the proportion of the 
monthly payment allocable to the finance charge will be less if the payment is made 
early and greater if the payment is made late. If there have been adjustments in 
allocation because of early or late payments over the life of the credit where the 
equal payment method is employed, the amount of the last payment will be equal 
to the sum of unpaid principal and outstanding finance charges, and therefore may 
be less or greater than previous payments. However, the practice of the creditor will 
often provide that no adjustment of the amounts allocated to principal and interest 
will be made for early or late payments within stated limits. Under the per cent per 
month method the dollar amount of finance charges which the debtor will have to 
pay over the life of the credit can be calculated at the time the credit is advanced 
only if it is assumed that all payments will be made exactly on schedule. This cal-
culation will be inaccurate to the extent that there are any late or early payments. 
See JOHNSON, METIIODS OF STATING CONSUMER FINANCE CHARGES 30-31 (1961) [hereinafter 
cited as JOHNSON]. 
3. The seventh draft of the Uniform Small Loan Law, 1942, provides: "Section 13. 
(a) Every licensee hereunder may contract for and receive, on any loan of money not 
exceeding $300 in amount, charges at a rate not exceeding 3 per cent a month on 
that part of the unpaid principal balance of any loan not in excess of $100, and 2 
per cent a month on any remainder of such unpaid principal balance .... (c) In addi-
tion to the charges herein provided for, no further or other amount whatsover shall 
be directly or indirectly charged, contracted for, or received." See CuRRAN, TRENDS IN 
CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 144, 152-53 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CURRAN]. Miss 
Curran's book is an excellent compilation of the consumer credit laws and will be 
utilized throughout this article as the authoritative statement of existing laws. 
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try in the past fifteen years.4 Precomputation has become popular for 
two reasons. First, lenders maintain that it allows simplification of 
operations. Under the per cent per month on declining balance sys-
tem, each payment must be prorated to finance charge and principal 
by a clerk. Under precomputation, the clerk need ordinarily make 
no calculation at the time he receives the installment. Late payments 
are handled by means of a penalty charge. Only in the case of a pre-
payment must any calculation be made. Second, precomputation 
normally provides the lender with a larger return where a borrower 
prepays or refinances than does the per cent per month on declining 
balance method. 5 If the rate is graduated, the finance charge for the 
early portion of the contract is made up of a higher proportion of 
low rate charge than is true of the finance charge for the contract as a 
whole. This is true because as we move toward maturity the principal 
of the debt is being reduced, thereby removing more and more of the 
principal to which the lo,v rate applies. But under a precomputation 
system the entire finance charge is included in the obligation of the 
debtor and upon prepayment or refinancing the creditor is allowed 
to retain that fraction of the finance charge which is "earned." By 
standard methods of calculating refunds this "earned" fraction is a 
function of time elapsed and principal outstanding. But if this frac-
tion is applied to the entire finance charge it will produce a greater 
4. See CURRAN ~2-25, and chart 2, at 158-66. Under many statutes governing small 
loan companies which compute charges under the per cent per month method, lenders 
have been authorized to use the alternative method of precomputing the amount of 
finance charges payable over the period of the installment contract as a whole. Com• 
putation is made on the basis of the applicable per cent per month charge and on 
the assumption that all installments will be made on schedule. The total amount of 
finance charges is then added to the principal at the time the credit is advanced, 
and the debtor pays back the sum of the principal and the finance charge in periodic 
installments. 
5. Since the obligation to the creditor includes the total finance charge, if the 
debtor prepays the creditor would be receiving unearned finance charges unless an 
adjustment were made. There are various procedures for calculating amounts to be 
returned by the creditor in the event of a prepayment of principal. The most common 
method required by statute is the "rule of 78," or "sum of the digits" formula. Under 
this method, allocation of finance charges is made as follows: First, the numbers of the 
months of the credit term are added. For example: in a 12-month credit, we add the 
numbers one through twelve, arriving at a sum of 78. Second, the finance charge is 
allocated to each month of the credit by multiplying it by a fraction, the numerator 
of which is the number of the specific month in reverse chronological order and the 
denominator of which is the sum of the numbers of the period of the credit. For 
example: for a 12-month credit in which the finance charge is $6, the charge allocable 
to the first month is l¾s X • $6, and the charge allocable to the second month 
l½s X $6. If any part of the principal is prepaid, the creditor is required to refund 
to the debtor the "unearned" portion of the finance charge. The problem of prepay• 
ment is particularly important because refinancing is a very common occurrence, 
Refinancing is treated as a prepayment in full of the outstanding credit and a simulta-
neous entry into another credit contract. 
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yield to the creditor because the entire finance charge is made up 
of a higher proportion of high rate charge than is the finance charge 
for the elapsed portion of the contract calculated on a non-precom-
putation basis. The high percentage of cases in which the borrower 
refinances makes this additional return yielded of some significance 
to the lender.6 
2. Credit union loans. There is more uniformity of computa-
tional method in credit union operations than in any other segment 
of the finance industry. The usual statutory mandate allows the 
board of directors to set a maximum finance charge not in excess of 
one per cent per month on the declining balance. Credit unions have 
almost unanimously retained this computational method through 
the years despite trends in different directions in other segments of 
the consumer finance industry.7 Recently, however, some credit 
unions have shmvn interest in adopting a precomputation system. 
3. Retail installment sales. In the nineteenth century, when mer-
chants began to sell their goods on credit, the courts were forced 
to decide how to treat the credit charge under the usury laws, 
which set limits on the amount that could be charged for a 
loan of money or forbearance of debt. As a result, the time-
price doctrine emerged; the courts held that one can offer his goods 
for sale at two prices-a credit, or time, price and a cash price. The 
difference between the two--the time-price differential---<:an exceed 
the amount allowable under the usury law because it is not interest. 8 
Moreover, the courts have upheld the time-price doctrine even when 
the credit price is determined by merely adding a finance charge to 
the cash price. Doubtless this background had a part in the develop-
ment of the practice in sales finance transactions of adding the fi-
nance charge to the cash price of the article and having the total re-
paid in installments. This is the add-on method of computing fi-
nance charges, and is the standard method used today in installment 
sales transactions.9 Furthermore, the add-on method of computation 
6. For a treatment of the extent of the advantage of precomputation over per cent 
per month on prepaid loans, see MoRS 28-33. Dr. Mors cites a New York Banking De-
partment study indicating that during a period from 1945 to 1957, about eighty per 
cent of all consumer finance company loans in New York were refinanced. MoRS 32-33, 
109-11. 
7. See CURRAN, chart 6, at 194-203. See also JoHNsON 22-25; MoRS 12-13. 
8. For a discussion of the time-price doctrine and a statement of authorities con• 
ceming it, see Britton & Ulrich, The Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act-Historical 
Background and Comparative Legislation, 53 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 137, 143 (1958); Warren, 
Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Instalment Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839, 841-51 
(1959); Comment, Limiting Consumer Credit Charges by Reinterpretation of General 
Usury Laws and by Separate Regulation, 55 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 303-10 (1960). 
9. See MoRS 19-24. The finance charge may be stated in terms of percentages 
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is the easiest to apply to what is often an irregular amount-the un-
paid balance of the cash price. This is an important factor in a busi-
ness where the initial finance charge computation has to be made by 
a seller rather than by a financial institution.10 
Virtually all of the retail installment sales acts (most of them 
passed between 1948 and 1955) adopted the add-on method of com• 
putation for rate ceiling purposes. Most rate ceiling provisions are 
stated in terms of either per cent per year or dollars per hundred 
per year. A few prescribe the per cent per month times the number 
of months method of computation, with the total being added on 
at the inception of the transaction. Other rate ceilings are in terms 
of per cent per month on the declining balance, to be computed in 
advance and added on; this essentially amounts to precomputation. 
Still other statutes allow an add-on charge plus a monthly charge, 
with the latter being precomputed and added on in advance.11 
4. Installment loan transactions. When commercial banks en• 
tered the consumer financing field in the 1930's, they did so in two 
ways: indirectly, by purchasing retail installment sales contracts from 
dealers, and directly, by making personal loans. For the most part 
their indirect financing of consumer sales did not require legislative 
sanction because the time-price doctrine insulated these operations 
from the usury statutes, although in some states there was a problem 
caused by the limitation of the rate of discount a bank might charge 
upon the purchase of a note or other obligation. Their personal 
loans could not, of course, enjoy the sanctuary provided by the time-
price doctrine, but as banks became more active in this field statutes 
were passed allowing them to make personal loans at rates in excess 
(6% per year) or dollars per hundred (six dollars per hundred per year), with no 
change in result. If the annual rate is six dollars per hundred and the term of the 
credit is two years, the finance charge on a credit of $100 would be $12, The debtor 
would receive $100 and would be required to pay back to the creditor $112 over the 
term, of the credit in installments. The calculation of the finance charge under the 
add-on method is made at the inception of the credit, and the finance charge is 
computed on the assumption that the payments will be made on time. Hence, the 
same problems in regard to prepayment previously discussed in note 5 exist here, 
The statutes tend to deal with them in similar ways. In general, the "rule of 78" is 
prescribed to govern refunds when prepayments arc made. With respect to late 
payments, it is common for statutes to prescribe delinquency charges expressed in 
terms of a certain percentage of the delinquent installment, subject to an overall 
dollar maximum for any one installment. 
10. "The main reason that finance companies suggested that sellers use add-on in 
preference to discount rates in computing finance charges to consumers probably lies 
in the simplicity of computation. Simplicity was important because many small sellers 
were not well versed in financing procedures and practices and obtained help from 
financing agencies." MoRS 22-23. 
11. Sec CURRAN, charts 12 &: 13, at 256-77. 
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of those prescribed by the usury acts. Some of these statutes were not 
restricted to banks, but covered any entity, except small loan licens-
ees, which made the kinds of loans permitted under the statute.12 
Finance charges on commercial bank loans are usually made 
under the discount computational method. The traditional dis-
count pattern molded the shape of the statutes which set rate ceil-
ings on personal installment loans made by both commercial and 
industrial banks.13 In many states the lender was simply allowed to de-
duct in advance the contract rate of interest permitted by the usury 
statute for the period over which repayment was scheduled. Thus the 
discount method of computation remains predominant under the in-
stallment loan laws. However, the add-on method is employed in a 
substantial number of jurisdictions, and a modification of the add-
on scheme is used in those jurisdictions in which interest is precom-
puted on the declining balance. 
5. Revolving credit. The traditional thirty-day charge account, 
which permits buyers to pay for their goods within thirty days of 
billing without any finance charge, proved inadequate to meet the 
credit needs of retail "f?uyers of soft goods. Furthermore, sellers of 
soft goods found it infeasible to use the traditional installment sale 
contract. Thus, in recent years soft-goods retailers have turned from 
• 
the old charge account to the revolving credit account. A retailer offer-
ing revolving credit assesses the buyer's credit worthiness and assign~ 
a certain credit balance which the buyer is entitled to carry so long 
as he makes monthly payments of a prescribed amount. When the 
buyer pays off his outstanding balance his monthly payments cease, 
only to commence once more when he makes his next credit pur-
chase at that retail outlet.14 
Computation of the credit charge in revolving credit transactions 
12. See CURRAN 65-75. The entry of industrial or "Morris Plan" banks into the 
area of consumer credit preceded that of commercial J:>anks by two decades. For a 
discussion of the development and regulation of industrial banking, see CURRAN 52-60; 
JOHNSON 25-26; MoRS 15-19. 
13. See MoRS 18-19. Under the discount method, the appropriate rate of finance 
charge is applied to the principal of the credit and the resulting finance charge is 
deducted in advance. For example, if the rate is 6% per year and the principal is 
$100 to be repaid in installments over a term of two years, the computation would be: 
6% X $100 X 2, resulting in a finance charge of $12. The $12 finance charge is then 
deducted from the $100 principal, leaving a net advance to the debtor of $88 to be 
repaid in periodic installments over the term of the credit. The rate may also be 
" stated in dollars per hundred per year. Under the di~count method the finance charge 
is calculated at the inception of the credit extension on the assumption that the pay-
ments will be made on time. Prepayments and late payments are treated in the same 
manner as that discussed in notes 5 & 9 supra. 
14. See generally JOHNSON 47-50. For detailed treatments of the subject, see CoLE, 
REVOLVING CREDIT (1957); Comment, Revolving Credit, 55 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 330-48 (1960). 
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can be made in a number of different ways, but usually the charge 
is a fixed percentage of the balance in the account at a given time 
each month. A very common practice is to charge the customer 1 ½ 
per cent of the balance in his account at the beginning of a billing 
period. For instance, if the outstanding balance at the beginning 
of the period is $100, the $1.50 finance charge is added to the $100, 
and the debtor's balance then becomes $101.50, which must be 
repaid in future monthly payments. 
6. Check credit plans.· The commercial banks saw no reason to 
leave the revolving credit concept to the retailers, and therefore 
developed check credit plans as their entry into the field. The bor-
rower is extended a line of credit up to a maximum amount, upon 
which he may draw, by writing checks on the bank. He is obliged 
to make monthly payments of a specified amount. The computa-
tional method employed to determine the finance charge is the re-
volving credit method, usually at a rate of one per cent per month 
on the balance plus a flat charge (commonly twenty-five cents) per 
check. The chief computational problem from the bank's standpoint 
is how to decide the amount of the principal balance upon which the 
:finance charge is to be computed. Different methods have been em-
ployed to arrive at the outstanding principal balance £or a billing 
period, ranging from an average of the actual daily balances to the 
balance outstanding on one day of the month.15 
The foregoing discussion shows that the different segments of 
the consumer credit industry use different methods to compute the 
charges which they make £or their service. For some, such as small-
loan companies and credit unions, the method of computation 
adopted by the creditor was a reflection of the form of computation 
prescribed by the applicable rate ceiling statute. In other cases the 
method of computation set out in the rate ceiling statute reflected 
the method used in the business practice of the regulated creditor; 
for example, the retail installment sales rate ceilings were set in 
terms of dollars per hundred per year add-on, the computational 
method which had previously been adopted in the industry, under 
the influence of the time-price doctrine and because of its conve-
nience. The emphasis of consumer credit legislation has been to set 
rate ceilings rather than to require disclosure of finance charges in 
terms of rates. Some consumer credit statutes contain no require-
ment of disclosure of finance charges; others require only that the 
dollar amount of the finance charge be disclosed. 
15. See generally CURRAN 76-79. 
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Although the various segments of the finance industry are regu-
lated by different statutes and compute their finance charges in dif-
ferent ways, they perform the same general function-the financing 
of the American consumer. In many cases they are in direct competi-
tion with each other for the consumer's business. It is in these areas of 
actual or potential competition that full disclosure of finance charges 
is most important. For example, consider the case of a man who 
wants to buy an automobile which has a cash price of $2500. He may 
be told by the dealer that he can finance the purchase at a rate of six 
dollars per hundred per year on a thirty-month contract through a 
sales finance company. A bank might offer to lend him the purchase 
price at six per cent per year, discounted, with a maturity period 
of twenty-four months. He might also obtain a loan from a small 
loan company whose rates are 2½ per cent per month on the first 
$200, two per cent per month on the next $300, and % of one per 
cent on the remaining balance, over thirty-six months. A credit 
union to which the buyer belongs lends money at one per cent per 
month and pays an annual patronage dividend of uncertain amount. 
In addition, the buyer may have a savings account at a bank on 
which he receives four per cent per year interest. It is virtually im-
possible for the average buyer to determine which of the competing 
credit suppliers is offering him the cheapest credit. A comparison 
of these different sources of credit would require a level of mathe-
matical sophistication clearly not possessed by the average consumer .. 
An additional difficulty is that the consumer might not fully under-
stand the meaning of the rate quoted to him in those instances in 
which rates are in fact quoted. He may not know that on an install-
ment contract, six dollars per hundred per year is not the same as 
six per cent interest on the declining balance of the debt, but is 
nearly twelve per cent interest on a twelve-month contract.16 
It is in response to the need of the consumer to be told more 
about the cost of credit and to be able to compare competing sources 
16. In a regular installment contract part of the principal is paid back with each 
installment; hence, in a loan of $100 repayable in 12 monthly payments, the average 
outstanding balance over the period of the loan is about $50. Thus, if the con-
tract calls for a rate of $6 per hundred add-on or the actual rate is about dou-
ble the stated rate, since the finance charge is calculated on the basis of the out-
standing balance at the inception of the contract ($100). Under the constant-ratio 
method of computation, the actual rate increases on longer term contracts when 
add-on or discount methods are used; the rate of increase is much greater under the 
discount method. See JOHNSON 114-17. A number of studies have shown that consumers 
consistently underestimate the level of finance rates. See JUSTER &: SHAY, CONSUMER 
SENSITIVITY TO FINANCE RATES: AN EMPIRICAL AND ANALYTICAL lNVES'I'IGATION 47-75 
(1964) (hereinafter cited as JUSTER&: SHAY); MoRS 80-91. 
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of credit that the Douglas Bill was proposed.17 Generally speaking, 
the Douglas Bill requires all consumer credit suppliers to state their 
finance charges in terms of an annual interest rate and in terms of 
a dollar amount.18 The Douglas Bill is based upon two premises. 
First, it is assumed that the consumer will benefit from increased 
competition in the credit market, and that, for competition to work, 
the consumer must be in a position to know which of competing 
creditors is offering the lowest credit price. In order for this com-
parison to be made, the competing credit rates must be disclosed in 
a manner suitable for comparison. The necessary comparison can 
be made only if all credit suppliers are required to quote their fi-
nance charges in terms of a time rate, since time rates alone allow 
comparisons to be made regardless of differences in the amount of 
principal or in the maturity of the credit and variations in the re-
payment schedule. Second, for disclosure to be effective it must be 
in a form which is familiar to the consumer. With respect to the cost 
of credit, the consumer is familiar with the meaning of both dollar 
costs and annual interest rates, since the two credit transactions most 
familiar to the average consumer are the home mortgage and the sav-
ings account. For these reasons the Douglas Bill requires the disclo-
sure of finance charges in terms of both dollar cost and annual in-
terest rate. 
We recognize that disclosure of finance charges is an important 
problem in the consumer credit area, and we view the Douglas Bill 
as one possible solution to the problem. However, the purpose of 
this article is not to debate the merits of the Douglas Bill. It is our 
objective to examine the theoretical basis for disclosure of finance 
charges in the light of the practical operations of the consumer 
credit business with a view toward indicating a possible solution to 
the problem of disclosure, having due regard for the interests of 
both consumers and credit suppliers. 
II. FUNCTIONS OF DISCLOSURE OF FINANCE CHARGES 
The cost of credit may be disclosed to a consumer either in 
terms of dollar amounts or in terms of a rate based on time. If a rate 
17. The most recent version of the Douglas Bill is S. 2275, 89th Cong,, 1st Scss. 
(1965). The extensive hearings on prior versions of this bill are: Hearings on S. 1740 
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banlting and Currency, 87th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (Consumer Credit Labeling Bill); Hearings on S. 1740 Before a 
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1962) (Truth in Lending); Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Com• 
mittee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st &: 2d Scss. pts. 1·2 (1963-64) (Truth 
in Lending). 
18. S. 2275, supra note 17, § 4. 
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based on time is used, it can be an annual or a monthly rate. As 
we have seen, the annual time rate methods in common use are sim-
ple interest, discount, and dollars per hundred per year. In order 
to decide whether the best method of disclosing finance charges is 
in terms of dollar amounts or in terms of one of these time rates 
we must first explore the functions to be performed by disclosure 
of finance charges. 
There are three reasons for requiring disclosure of finance 
charges. First, the user of credit should know its cost in order 
to judge whether the extension of credit is worth the price. That 
method of disclosure which most meaningfully describes cost under 
the circumstances of the particular case should be chosen. Second, 
the disclosure should be made in such a manner that the user of 
credit can determine which of alternate sources of credit (which may 
or may not involve the same type of credit transaction) offers him 
the best deal. This second aspect of disclosure may conflict with the 
first, because it may require uniformity of method of disclosure for 
comparisons to be made. To the extent that some methods of dis-
closure are more informative in some types of credit transactions 
than in others, if only a single method is adopted, a compromise 
may be necessary. Third, the disclosure should allow the potential 
user of credit to determine whether it would be better to forgo 
dependence upon credit and to rely upon cash resources instead. 
This is really an aspect of the second function in that in both situ-
ations a comparison is being made between sources of funds. Thus, 
disclosure may be said to perform a descriptive and a shopping 
function. 
A. Descriptive Function 
Dollar disclosure of finance charges is common practice in the 
field of sales financing. Here retail installment sales laws generally 
require the seller to disclose the dollar amount of the finance charge 
as a separate item in the contract. Time rate disclosure is typical 
in small loan transactions; the buyer is informed that he is paying, 
for example, three per cent per month for the first $200, two per cent 
per month for the next $300, and one per cent per month for all 
excess amounts.19 Time rates can be disclosed in either annual or 
19. See JOHNSON 31-32, for methods of disclosure in small loans transactions. Under 
the small loans acts the debtor need only be informed what the rate ceilings are in 
small loan transactions. However, since the actual rates charged are usually at the 
ceiling level in this segment of the industry, compliance with the statutes amounts to 
disclosure of the actual charge made. 
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monthly terms. One per cent per month on the declining balance 
equals twelve per cent nominal annual interest. Disclosure of rates 
as dollars_per hundred per annum is an alternate method of stating 
an annual time rate. 
1. Dollar Disclosure v. Time Rate Disclosure 
In some transactions disclosure in terms of dollars is more mean-
ingful, while in others disclosure in terms of a time rate may be 
more intelligible to the consumer. The prices of goods and services 
are usually stated in terms of dollar amounts, and consumers are 
accustomed to making evaluations on this basis. The price of money, 
on the other hand, is normally stated in terms of a time rate. In a 
transaction involving both the extension of credit and the sale of 
goods or services, the method of disclosure of the finance charge 
establishes the characterization of the transaction in the mind of the 
consumer. For example, a person financing the purchase of a house 
by means of a long-term mortgage normally separates the transaction 
into nvo parts: the purchase of the house and the borrowing of 
money to pay for it. The buyer considers that the house costs 
$40,000 and that the loan of $25,000 obtained to help pay for the 
house costs 6 per cent per year. However, if the quotation were in 
terms of the total dollar cost of the transaction, the buyer would see 
his house as costing nearly $60,000 on a twenty-five year mortgage. 
This "cost" figure for the house does not allow for meaningful com-
parison with the dollar costs of other things that the buyer may pur-
chase. For instance, a person buying a $17 fan to be paid for in five 
monthly installments of four dollars does not normally separate the 
transaction into a purchase and an extension of credit to pay for the 
purchase. He is simply buying a fan. The $20 amount accurately in-
dicates to him what the fan costs. The finance charge in this transac-
tion in terms of a time rate-over seventy per cent nominal annual 
interest-may only lead him to believe that he is paying an exorbi-
tant rate of "interest." 
The simple explanation for the different manner in which a 
consumer looks at these nvo transactions is, of course, the time dif-
ferential in the nvo cases. The payment of a dollar today is not 
comparable to the obligation to pay a dollar in ten or twenty years. 
A comparison requires a calculation of the value of the use of 
money. This comparison can be made meaningfully by talking in 
terms of interest rates based on time. Wliere the time factor is not 
significant, as in the fan situation, the straight dollar comparison 
gives a more accurate picture. 
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Another problem which must be faced in choosing between dol-
lar and time rate disclosure is raised by the size of the transaction. 
Finance charges can be divided into two elements: (1) a charge for 
the use of money, which can be termed the interest charge (this in-
cludes both the economist's concept of "pure interest" and the com-
pensation for the risk of not being paid), and (2) service charges for 
administrative costs with respect to the credit, such as the costs or 
processing the credit and investigating the risk.20 If the amount of 
credit extended is very large, the proportion of the credit charge 
applicable to service charges will be small and the proportion ap-
plicable to interest charges will be large. The converse will be true 
where the amount of credit extended is small. Thus, a comparison 
of how much a smalf amount of credit should cost with how m:uch 
a large amount should cost cannot be made without taking into 
account service costs. However, there is a tendency to compare spe-
cific credit charges with some hypothetical standard of what the cost 
of credit should be. The best known examples of the price of 
money to the average citizen are the amount his money brings when 
lent to someone else (savings accounts and government bonds) and 
the amount he pays for money on his real estate mortgage. In these 
examples the rate is low and the finance charge is made up almost 
entirely of interest as opposed to service costs. The use of this kind 
of example has led to the so-called "six per cent myth." Therefore, 
if the method of disclosure invites comparison of transactions involv-
ing high service costs with transactions involving low service costs, 
the credit consumer may be misled in his value judgments. 
2. Disclosure of Dollar Amount of Monthly Payment 
The sale of goods on installment contracts has been analyzed 
above in terms of the sale of a product and the simultaneous exten-
sion of credit to finance the purchase. This analysis may require some 
refinement. Customarily, sales and leases have been treated as diverse 
concepts which can be given separate treatment. Actually, in the 
modern commercial world the two concepts have often become 
blurred. A credit sale covering the useful life of a product is eco-
nomically similar to a lease of the product over the same period. 
For example, the purchase of an automobile on credit and the pur-
chase of a five-year lease of that automobile may be economically 
more similar than they are different. There seems to be a trend to-
ward longer time-spans in installment sales contracts while at the same 
20. See JOHNSON, ch. 2; MoRS 75-78. 
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time built-in obsolescence has become commonplace in consumer 
goods. The two trends may converge so that in many cases the use-
ful life of the product and the time-span of the credit are substan-
tially the same. Where this is so it may be misleading to consider the 
transaction as primarily a purchase and sale. It might be more useful 
to recognize it as the payment by the "buyer" for the use of the prod-
uct over its useful life. This analysis is particularly convenient if the 
proportion of the people who pay cash for the product is very small. 
Where such is the case, employment of dollar amounts to indicate 
the purchase price of either the product or the credit may not be 
very descriptive. The amount of a monthly cash payment may, how-
ever, be very meaningful to the purchaser. 
It is very difficult to generalize concerning the extent to which 
buyers look.upon purchases in terms of the monthly dollar cost of 
using the product. Undoubtedly, a substantial number of buyers 
are accustomed to looking at 'their financial affairs in terms of their 
monthly or weekly disposable incomes and can make appraisals of 
their ability to pay only in those terms. For them, any disclosure 
which cannot be translated into periodic terms is meaningless.21 
It is clear, however, that any disclosure statute should take 
into account the differing natures of the various consumer credit 
transactions and the impact that any disclosure system is likely 
to have on the various kinds of credit consumers. We have discussed 
the three principal methods of disclosure: (I) total dollar cost of the 
credit or of the product being purchased; (2) amount of the credit 
charge expressed as a time rate; and (3) total monthly dollar cost 
of the credit or of the product being purchased. That these various 
methods are informative in some situations and misleading in others 
has been demonstrated. For this reason it might be undesirable to 
use certain kinds of disclosure in some classes of transactions. It 
might be that no single method of disclosure of finance charges can 
effectively further all the different objectives of disclosure. The only 
21. Economists disagree concerning the extent to which demand for consumer credit · 
is elastic with respect to such factors as the amount of the monthly payment, the 
amount of the down payment, or the level of the finance charge. One group assumes 
that consumer demand is most influenced by the size of the monthly payments and 
thus that a change in finance rates affects demand only to the extent that it changes 
the amount of the monthly payment. Since increases in finance charges spread over 
the length of the contract raise the monthly payments only slightly, this group argues 
that demand for consumer credit is relatively inelastic with respect to changes in 
finance charges. A 1964 study has led Juster and Shay to conclude that there is per• 
haps greater sensitivity to changes in finance charge rates than had been assumed, 
but only among families described as "unrationed" consumers: this classification 
includes those families with an economic position which is stable enough that they 
can borrow additional amounts of credit from low rate sources. See JUSTER &: SHAY 6-46, 
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alternatives, then, would be to require multiple methods of disclo-
sure or to tailor disclosure requirements to classes of transactions. 
B. Shopping Function 
It has long been a part of public policy in the United States to 
rely upon competition to ensure that the consumer receives the best 
product or service obtainable at the lowest possible price. However, 
price competition functions best when the various vendors are all 
selling the s~me product. When each merchant sells something a 
little different from the others, or when each merchant uses a dif-
ferent standard for measuring the price of his product, price com-
petition is more difficult. 
Little can be done about the problem of product differentiation. 
Different credit packages will continue to be available on the mar-
ket, and such diversity is desirable. Nevertheless, even within a 
system of diverse products uniformity of method of price quotation 
may be obtainable. Ideally, we should select the method of disclos-
ing finance charges which best lends itself to the comparison .of 
credit transactions that are not identical. 
To rely exclusively on dollar disclosure of the cost of credit does 
not seem promising in this regard.22 A person desiring to borrow 
$1000 will find it very difficult to compare the offer by one lender 
of a two-year contract calling for the payment of $1200 in twenty-
four equal monthly installments of $50, and the offer by another 
lender of a three-year contract calling for the payment of $1368 in 
thirty-six equal monthly installments of $38. The borrower may pre-
fer a long or short contract, and this may affect his judgment, but 
it is difficult for him to tell whether the higher or lower dollar cost 
is more "expensive." 
The difficulty involved in comparing dollars payable at different 
times, which is the core of the problem in the last example, can be 
avoided by the use of rates that are a function of time rather than 
of dollar amounts. Thus, if all grantors of credit were required to 
quote charges on the basis of a time rate, such as per cent per year 
on the declining balance, the consumer could be sure that the one 
quoting the lowest rate was asking least for his credit, regardless of 
the maturity time or the amount of the loan. This does not mean 
the consumer would necessarily accept the least expensive offer. It 
might be "cheaper" for a low-income consumer to pay less per 
month for a longer period, even if the rate is higher; but at least 
22. See MoRS 39-43. 
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the factors bearing on the choice are clarified. If the consumer is 
making a sacrifice in order to pay less per month, the rate will tell 
him so. 
It is also important to recognize the limitations of the shopping 
function. Insistence on uniformity for the purpose of comparison is 
justified only to the extent that shopping is feasible. To facilitate 
shopping, it is important that all alternative sources of credit quote 
their charges on the same basis. However, if in certain types of 
transactions some sources of credit are available and some as a prac-
tical matter are not, uniformity of disclosure need apply only to 
those sources that are in fact available. 
1. Cash Loans 
We can start with a breakdown bet.1veen cash loan transactions 
and credit sales of goods or services. In a sense this dichotomy is 
artificial, since practically all consumer cash loans are made for the 
purpose of paying for goods or services (which may have been 
bought prior to the extension of credit). On the other hand, the 
dichotomy is useful in analyzing the shopping problem. Since money 
is fungible, consumer shopping for money can drive the price of 
money to a competitive level. Assuming that a uniform system of. 
quoting rates is adopted, the consumer can readily shop for money 
itself, and competition in the credit industry will be more effective. 
Different segments of the consumer credit industry charge sig-
nificantly different rates. For instance, commercial banks normally 
charge lower rates on personal loans than do small loan companies. 
Part of the explanation lies in the credit worthiness of their cus-
tomers and in statutory limitations on the size of loans that each 
type of lender is allowed to make, but such segmentation seems 
artificial. Suppliers of a fungible commodity could serve most seg-
ments of the market by adjusting rates to credit risks. Undoubtedly 
some customers of small loan companies would qualify as borrowers 
from commercial banks. It may be that the difference in techniques 
of disclosure of charges tends to impede competition between the 
t.1\l'o groups. If this is true, a common method of computation for 
disclosure purposes would make price differences more apparent and 
thus increase competition. 
2. Credit Sales of Goods and Services 
Shopping for credit is effective whenever credit can be separated 
from the product or service to be bought with the credit. A person 
desiring to buy a new Chevrolet on an installment contract can 
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effectively shop for both the car and the credit. Similar Chevrolets 
are fungible; since all dealers quote cash prices, the buyer can choose 
the one quoting the lowest price. He can also shop for the cheapest 
credit if all lenders of credit, including both sales finance companies 
and cash lenders, are required to quote prices on a common basis, 
such as in terms of a rate based on time. 
Of course, the vendor of a differentiated product who also pro-
vides credit financing can arbitrarily allocate part of his price to 
finance charges and part to the purchase price of the product. How-
ever, there are practical restraints on this allocation if the seller makes 
many sales to cash buyers and if the amount of the finance charge 
is large enough to encourage buyers to shop for the best credit rate. 
In this situation, if the vendor must quote a cash price, he cannot 
allocate too much of the credit price to the finance charge without 
incurring the risk that buyers will accept his unrealistically low 
cash price and finance elsewhere. He runs less risk by allocating a 
disproportionately high amount to cash price, but by doing so he 
might injure his cash market. At any rate, this kind of problem can-
not be entirely avoided whether there is uniformity in credit charge 
disclosure or not. 
On the other hand, if the vendor sells almost exclusively to credit 
buyers, as do those who deal only with low-income buyers, or if the 
credit charge is small, there is great leeway with respect to allocation 
of finance charges. For example, it is common for some credit cloth-
iers and jewelers to make no separate charge for credit; their prices 
are quoted as the cost of buying the goods over a given period of 
months with no allocation made between the cash price of the goods 
and the cost of credit. Other dealers may state a charge for credit 
that is unrealistically low as compared to the cost to the dealer of 
extending the credit. These dealers may emphasize in their adve:i~ 
tising that no charge or a very low charge is being made for credit. 
In fact, the consumer may be paying a large price for credit, since 
the price of the goods sold may have been greatly inflated. This 
points up one danger in overemphasizing the cost of credit as a shop-
ping device: it encourages some merchants to mislead consumers 
into believing that they are receiving a benefit in paying low finance 
charges when the total credit price of the product sold may actually 
be excessive. One observer has pointed out that in poverty areas 
customers tend to be captives of the dealer because of their lack of 
credit worthiness.23 In such a market there is ho shopping for credit, 
, 
23. CAPLOVII'Z, THE POOR PAY MORE, ch, 2 (1963). 
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and therefore it is doubtful whether disclosure as a protective mea-
sure has any beneficial effect. 
Shopping for credit is less effective whenever credit is closely 
tied to the goods or services to be bought with it. For example, as-
sume that a credit buyer goes into a department store to purchase 
an.item for a cash price of $17.50. Disclosing to him in his contract 
that finance charges will equal a stated annual rate means much less 
to him than a similar disclosure means to the purchaser of a new car, 
because it is more difficult for the former buyer to shop for credit, 
as such. It is unlikely that he will go to a cash lender to borrow 
money to pay for his purchase. Consequently, there is no compel-
ling reason to have cash lenders and department stores disclose fi-
nal).ce charges on a uniform basis. The chief alternative open to the 
credit buyer in this example is another retailer. In this kind of shop-
ping, the price of goods and the price of credit are inextricably 
bound together. The buyer must compare the combined price of 
product and credit at the two competing sources. To the extent that 
a large proportion of goods sold by competing department stores 
and similar retailers are not precisely fungible, the problem is fur-
ther compounded. Retailer A sells electric fans for $23 on revolving 
credit, charging 1 ½ per cent of the monthly balance and requiring 
a monthly payment of at least ten per cent. Retailer B, a mail order 
company, sells its own brand of electric fan for $17 cash or for four 
monthly payments of $5. The extent to which the price of credit 
affects the buying decision with respect to this kind of transaction 
is problematical. 
A relatively recent development has changed to some extent the 
problem considered in the previous paragraph. The check credit 
plans of commercial banks make it possible to shop independently 
for credit even in the type of situation just described. These plans 
are becoming popular in some sections of the country, but in many 
areas are not yet a major factor. However, it is important to con-
sider this development because it is a good example of a new prac-
tice created to meet new competitive needs. 
3. Extent of Credit Shopping 
It is extremely difficult, in the absence of empirical evidence, to 
categorize transactions in which shopping for credit is a substantial 
factor. Theoretically, credit shopping can exist with respect to any 
sale transaction in which the credit balance is as large as the smallest 
cash loan available from normal commercial sources. It is probable, 
however, that credit shopping is actually much more limited than 
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this would suggest. The sale of new automobiles presents a clear case 
in which credit shopping is pr~cticed; it is difficult to ascertain the 
extent to which shopping for credit exists with regard to lower 
priced items. such as appliances and furniture. , 
The sale of small-ticket items is a particularly troublesome area. 
It is questionable to what extent disclosure of finance charges in 
terms of a time rate performs any useful function in furthering 
credit shopping here. Moreover, it is very difficult to obtain any 
meaningful uniformity of disclosure. We· suspect that buyers are 
more interested in learning the total dollar price of an item than 
they are in being told that the finance charge amounts to two per 
cent per month or twenty-four per cent per year. The value of dis-
closure as an aid to credit shopping is even more questionable if 
the dealer sells only to credit buyers and states that there is no 
charge for credit. Requiring him to break down his price into a 
cash price and a finance charge and to disclose the time rate of the 
finance· charge is likely to result in the establishment of a highly 
arbitrary rate which would be of little use to a consumer. 
Disclosure of finance charges serves another shopping function; 
it enables the potential borrower to decide whether he will use credit 
or draw upon his liquid assets to meet his needs. If a person desiring 
to buy a $3,000 automobile realized that he must pay finance 
charges on that sum at the rate of eighteen per cent per year, he 
might choose to withdraw the necessary funds from his savings ac-
count on which he is earning under five per cent per year. At pres-
ent, since finance charges in this kind of transaction are quoted in 
terms of dollars per hundred, purchasers may not be acutely aware 
of the disparity between the costs of financing and the earnings from 
their savings accounts. It can thus be argued that since savings insti-
tutions quote earnings on deposits in terms of annual interest, fi-
mince charges should also be stated in these terms in order to pro-
vide maximum comparability. 
It is uncertain to what extent consumers actually engage in this 
kind of shopping for alternate sources of funds. The Juster-Shay · 
study indicates that some consumers are sensitive to finance charges 
as a basis for deciding whether to use credit or liquid assets.24 
Apparently, credit price sensitivity is highest in a particular group 
of consumers-those who have savings accounts and certain other 
indicia of economic stability. For this higher economic group, the 
statement of finance charges in terms of annual interest would pre-
24. See JUSTER &: SHAY 6-46. 
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sumably be of some benefit. On the other hand, there are many 
consumers who have no savings accounts or who prefer to hold their 
savings in reserve for emergencies. For this group, a quotation of 
consumer credit rates in terms of annual interest is of less impor-
. tance. 
III. FEASIBILITY OF DISCLOSING FINANCE CHARGES 
The foregoing analysis of the functions performed by disclosure 
of finance charges indicates that in some transactions disclosure in 
terms of a time rate would be beneficial to consumers. In other 
transactions time rate disclosure may be a neutral factor, neither 
helping nor harming the consumer. Only in short-term, small-size 
credit transactions is time rate disclosure possibly harmful in that 
it gives a misleading impression of the cost of credit.25 We can there-
. fore conclude that in the absence of other considerations it would 
theoretically be sound to :require time rate disclosure in most trans-
actions. However, time rate disclosure cannot be given by the credit 
supplier without some economic cost; any evaluation of the desir-
ability of required time rate disclosure must take into account these 
economic costs. It would seem sensible to require time rate disclo-
sure only in those cases in which the economic benefit to be derived 
from such disclosure outweighs the economic cost of providing it. 
There are two types of time rates which might be used if time 
rate disclosure were required. The first type expresses the finance 
charge as a rate based on the declining balance of the debt as it is 
repaid. For example, if there is a credit of $1,200 with a finance 
charge of $72, and the debt is repayable in twelve monthly install-
ments of $106, the finance charge is calculated in terms of the aver-
age amount of principal outstanding over the term of the credit. 
Thus, the rate would be approximately 11.08 per cent per year or 
0.92 per cent per month.26 The second type of time rate expresses 
the finance charge as a rate based on the total amount of the credit 
25. We suspect that if a merchant were required to disclose his finance charges in 
small transactions in terms of a shockingly high rate, he would lower the rate to a 
tolerable level by arbitrarily allocating a greater part of the total credit price of the 
product to the cash price. This can be done by any merchant who sells a large pro• 
portion of his goods on credit. The net result is that cash buyers would have to 
subsidize credit buyers. 
26. This calculation was made according to the constant ratio method of charge 
distribution. Under that method, it is assumed that each installment payment Is 
credited partly to the amount financed (principal) and partly to finance charge, in the 
same proportion that the original amount financed and the original finance charge 
bore to the original debt. Interest charges can also be calculated according to the 
annuity method of charge distribution. By that method the interest charges for the 
example given are 10,9% annual and 0.93% monthly. See JOHNSON 108-10. 
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at the inception of the credit. Using the same example, the rate 
would be six dollars per hundred per year, or fifty cents per hundred 
dollars per month. In the subsequent discussion, the first type of 
time rate will be referred to as "interest on declining balance" and 
the second type as "dollar add-on." 
The question whether the use of a time rate is feasible has two 
aspects. First, is it possible to give such a rate in a certain type of 
transaction? If so, is the economic cost of giving a time rate worth 
the economic benefit to be derived from the disclosure? 
A. Impossibility of Time Rate Disclosure 
It is mathematically possible to give a time rate whenever the 
amount of the credit, the amount of the finance charge, and the 
amount and time of the payments are known. If the payments are 
regular in amount and interval, the calculation of a time rate can 
be made using a simple formula. If the payments are irregular in 
either amount or interval, the calculation becomes more difficult 
as the irregularities increase. In cases involving highly irregular re-
payment schedules, the use of computers may be needed, but there 
is no situation in which the determination cannot be made. How-
ever, if any one of the factors named-amount of credit, amount of 
finance charge, or amount and time of payments--is not known, it 
is impossible to give a time rate. 
If the purpose of time rate disclosure is to tell the consumer 
how much he is being charged so that he can decide whether to en-
ter into the contract,, then it is vital that the disclosure be made 
before the contract is made. In some situations it is not possible to 
make accurate time rate disclosure at the inception of the transac-
tion. There are two common examples: revolving charge accounts 
and check credit plans.27 
27. Revolving charge accounts are of two types, those offered by retailers and those 
• offered by banks or other financial institutions. With a retailer revolving charge 
account the customer may purchase goods at the retail store with which he has the 
account, and the purchases are debited to an open account. Normally the retailer will 
not allow charges above a certain figure. The amounts debited to the customer's 
account ~re payable by the customer in installments. Since small retailers frequently 
find it uneconomical to have their own individual revolving credit system, sometimes 
a number of retailers will cooperate in forming a commonly owned agency to operate 
such a system. However, it is becoming more common for retailers, large and small, 
to rely upon the charge account plans of financial institutions. These plans are repre-
sented by such well-known credit cards as Bankamericard, Carte Blanche, and Diner's 
Club. The retailer. allows the customer to pay for the goods by using his credit card. 
The financial institution then pays the retailer the amount of the purchase, less a 
charge. The financial institution then bills the customer. Terms of payment vary 
considerably, but many organizations offer terms similar to those of retailer revolving 
charge accounts. 
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There are various ways of computing finance charges in revolv-
ing credit accounts, but we will take one common method as illus-
trative. Each customer is given a monthly billing date. On this date 
each month he must pay a credit service charge equal to 1 ½ per cent 
of the unpaid balance in his account at the beginning of the previ-
ous ·billing period. Assume that a customer, X, is assigned the first 
day of the month as his billing date and that he opens an account 
on February 4. He makes several purchases totaling $100 during 
the month of February. On March 1 he will be billed. The bill will 
~show an opening balance (unpaid amounts as of February 1) of zero 
and purchases during the month of $100. Since the credit service 
charge is calculated on the basis of the opening balance, no credit 
service charge is made. If X pays the balance on or before March 31 
he will not have to pay any credit charge. If he does not pay, the 
$100 becomes the opening balance for the April 1 bill and a credit 
service charge of $1.50 will be imposed. To illustrate the impossi-
bility of giving time rate disclosure, we shall assume that X makes 
the $100 purchase on February 4 and pays the $100 on March 31. 
He has had fifty-five days of credit for which he must pay nothing. 
However, if he pays the $100 on April 1 he has had fifty-six days of 
credit for which he must pay $1.50. In one sense it might be said 
that he paid $1.50 for one day's credit. If he does not pay the $100 
in one payment but rather pays it off in installments over several 
months, there will be additional finance cht1-rges and again the rate 
will change. The time during the billing cycle when purchases are 
made and the time when payment is tendered are varying factors 
which make it impossible to tell the customer in advance how much 
he will pay for credit in terms of either a dollar amount or a rate. 
The most that can be done :with respect to disclosure by such a seller 
is to explain to the customer the "rules of the game" so that he may 
fully understand the conditions under which a credit service charge 
is made and how it is calculated. 
Check credit plans offered by banks raise similar problems. 
Under one common plan the customer is given a credit of a fixed 
dollar amount. He may ·write checks on the bank up to this amount; 
when the bank clears a check, a loan is effectively made. The cus-
tomer is charged one per cent per month on the daily balances in 
his account. Unlike the 1½ per cent charge in the department store 
plan just described, this one per cent is a true time rate, and if this 
were the only charge that the bank made it could tell the customer 
that he was being charged one per cent per month or twelve per cent 
per year interest. However, it costs money to process checks and to 
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make entries in an account; it is obviously more expensive to the 
bank if a customer borrows $100 by writing ten checks of $10 each 
than if he borrows the $100 by writing one check. To compensate 
for the cost of processing, the bank makes an additional charge of 
twenty-five cents per check. This twenty-five cent additional charge 
applied to the above example makes a substantial difference in the 
effective rate which the customer is paying for his credit.28 Since the 
number of checks which will be ·written cannot be predicted in ad-
vance, no time rate or dollar amount can be disclosed to the cus-
tomer. Again, the most that can be done is to disclose to the cus-
tomer the method by which the finance charge will be calculated and 
imposed. 
It is possible in both of the above situations for the creditor to 
construct "typical" patterns followed by users of its credit and to 
state what the effective rate of charge would have been in such cases. 
If a particular customer's buying habits fit the hypothetical pattern, 
the disclosure is valuable. However, if the customer's buying habits 
do not fit the hypothetical, the disclosure may be not only unhelp-
ful, but even positively misleading. A consumer must be highly 
sophisticated to compare his credit patterns accurately with those of 
a hypothetical case and then to make the adjustments needed to 
arrive at useful information.29 
B. Economic Feasibility of Time Rate Disclosure 
Open-end credit, such as that discussed in the preceding two 
examples, is the only situation which presents a problem of impos-
28. If it is assumed that the $100 is paid off in five monthly_ installments, with the 
first installment paid one month after the loan, the person who wrote ten checks 
would pay about 22% annual interest and the person who wrote one check would 
pay about 13% annual interest. 
29. At the request of Professor Robert W. Johnson, a leading retailer selected at 
random 205 of its revolving credit accounts and calculated, on the basis of the annual 
interest on the declining balance, the actual rate of the finance charge for the period 
September 10, 1964, through September 9, 1965. The results were as follows: 
Annual Rate Number of Accounts Per Cent of Total 
0% 53 25.8% 
1%- 9.9% 23 11.2% 
10%-14.9% 27 13.2% 
15%·16.9% 22 10.7% 
17%-17.9% · 40 19.5% 
18%-18.9% 28 13.7% . 
19%-20.9% 12 5.9% 
205 100.0% 
This retailer used a billing system and charge identical to that described in the 
text. If this sampling is representative of revolving credit accounts, it indicates clearly 
that"it is not accurate to equate the 1½% monthly charge with an 18% annual rate 
as is sometimes suggested. 
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sibility. Some opponents of time rate disclosure have, however, at-
tempted to fit ordinary closed-end installment contracts into the 
same pattern. This view seems to have no merit. The arguments 
made in behalf of this view may be assessed by taking an example 
previously used. A borrower is given $1,200, which is to be repaid 
in twelve monthly installments of $106. We have indicated that the 
time rate on this contract is 11.08 per cent per year or six dollars 
per hundred per year. However, in a large number of cases payments 
are not made on time and late penalties are imposed. A surprisingly 
large number of small loan contracts are never carried through to 
completion according to their original terms. Rather, they are re-
financed; the original loan is paid off by a second loan from the 
same or a different lender. Furthermore, some loan contracts are 
paid off before maturity. In most cases refinancing or prepayment 
will result in the refund to the borrower of unearned finance 
charges, a factor which may materially change the effective rate of 
charge.30 If a substantial number, or, as in some situations, a large 
majority, of installment credit contracts are not completed as 
planned, any rate stated at the inception of the contract will in fact 
be inaccurate. To the extent that these variations are material, time 
rate disclosure could be deceptive. 
If the only purpose of time rate disclosure is to state accurately 
the actual cost of credit to the consumer, this argument would have 
great weight. If, on the other hand, the principal function of time 
rate disclosure is to tell the consumer which one of various sources 
of credit is least expensive, accuracy with respect to the actual 
amount which will in fact be charged is not vital. The variables are 
created by the possibility that the consumer will incur penalties for 
late payment, will prepay, or will refinance. In allowing the consumer 
to shop for credit, these variables are material only if the competing 
creditors used different methods of dealing with late payments, pre-
payments, and refinancing. For example, creditor A offers a loan at 
twelve per cent and creditor B offers a loan of the same amount and 
with the same repayment schedule at eleven per cent. B's loan ap-
pears to be cheaper. But suppose B exacts larger penalties for late 
payments and refunds less of the finance charge in the event of pre-
payment or refinancing. If B's experience is that a majority of his 
loans result in late payments, prepayments, or refinancing, he may 
in fact be charging the majority of his customers more than A would 
charge them. A person contemplating borrowing from either A or 
30. See notes 5 &: 6 supra. 
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B would therefore have to consider the likelihood of his completing 
the contract as planned before choosing B's loan. However, if pen-
alties for late payment and refunds of unearned finance charges for 
prepayment or refinancing are standardized by statute, the possi-
bility of deception in this kind of case is removed, and time rate 
disclosure will allow the borrower to shop effectively. Even though 
the variables discussed may affect the actual cost of the credit to the 
consumer, if they are standardized they will not affect the relative 
price of credit among competing lenders. Thus, with respect to in-
stallment contracts with set schedules of payments, rate disclosure 
based on the assumption that the contracts will be completed as 
written can be meaningfully made. 
Another argument often made by opponents of time rate disclo-
sure is that it is very difficult to take into account the irregularities 
in a certain contract. This argument has been directed principally 
against disclosure expressed in terms of interest on the declining 
balance, but it also applies to some extent to dollar add-on disclo-
sure. Suppose, for example, that a dealer offers to sell an automobile 
for a cash price of $3,000. A buyer offers a used car valued at $1,000 
as a down payment and wishes to finance the rest. The purchase is 
made on December I. The dealer agrees that the $2,000 balance will 
be financed on a contract requiring twenty-four monthly payments 
of $96.67. As a selling point the dealer agrees that the first payment 
will not be due until February I. Or, if the buyer is a seasonal 
worker who is not paid during the two summer months (such as 
some teachers), the dealer might agree to let the buyer postpone 
the July and August payments until the end of the contract. The 
finance charge in both cases is $320, and it can easily be computed 
by the dealer. If his rate is eight dollars per hundred per year, it is 
a simple matter to multiply $8 by 20 by 2. The monthly payment 
is also easily computed by dividing $2,320 by 24. However, if in 
either case the dealer is required to give the interest rate on the 
declining balance or a true dollar add-on rate, he cannot do so with-
out a complex mathematical calculation. The term of the credit is 
not twenty-four months, but rather is almost twenty-five months in 
the first case, and is nearly twenty-nine months in the other case. 
Furthermore, in both hypotheticals some of the payments fall at 
irregular intervals. For these reasons the true dollar add-on rate is 
under his usual eight dollar rate. Nor can the true dollar add-on rate 
or the interest rate on the declining balance be obtained from a stan-
dard precomputed chart. A chart can be prepared only on the basis 
of a given term and a given schedule of payments. 
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If exact rates were not required, a reasonable approximation of 
either a dollar add-on rate or an interest rate on the declining bal-
ance could be given in relatively long-term contracts.81 Therefore, 
economic feasibility in cases involving irregular contracts may de-
pend upon whether approximations are acceptable. To require more 
accurate disclosure than that indicated in the above examples may 
mean that substantial additional economic costs will have to be in-
curred by lenders. It seems doubtful that business can operate effec-
tively if complex calculations must be made with respect to every 
transaction. The calculations could not be made by salesmen; rather, 
they would have to be made by special personnel using mechanical 
calculators. Although there is no basis for estimating what these ad-
ditional economic costs might be, it is unlikely that the increased 
accuracy obtainable by precise calculations is worth any substantial 
expense. 
In order for approximations to be meaningful with respect to 
an irregular contract, the irregularities cannot depart too much from 
the norm. In the case of highly irregular contracts it is not possible 
to give even a reasonably accurate time rate except with the aid of 
complex mathematical formulae. Such contracts are probably not 
31. M~st contracts are irregular in some respects. Most irregularities are due to the 
fact that (1) the period between the date of the contract and the due date for the first 
installment is either shorter or longer than the period between all other payments, or 
(2) the debtor is allowed to postpone some other payments. A person whose first pay• 
ment falls due thirty days after the date of sale pays a slightly higher rate than the 
person whose first payment falls due after forty-five days if in all other respects the 
contracts are the same. Similarly, the debtor who can postpone some later payments 
pays a lower rate than the one who cannot. In short-term contracts irregularities in 
the time of first payment can cause significant distortion, but where the time is rela-
tively long-one year or more-the distortion is much less. For the first example given 
in the text (a delayed first payment in a 24-payment contract at $8 per SIOO per 
year) the effective annual rate is $14.68% if the first payment is regular, i.e., made 
one month after the contract date, and is 13.54% if the first payment is not made 
until two months after the contract date. In most cases the first payment will not be 
delayed as much as two months. Irregularities of this kind are ignored if a formula 
which gives a rate based on the number of payments rather than exact lapse of time 
is used. Under such a formula all contracts calling for twenty-four monthly payments 
would yield the same rate, and slight differences in the lengths of the contracts arc not 
considered. The following formulae will produce a rate which does not take into 
account irregularities and which will always slightly overstate the actual rate paid if 
there is a postponement in either the first or a subsequent payment: 
Annual Interest Rate Dollars Per Hundred Per Year 
2PC 
R=----




R is the rate; P is 4 if payments arc quarterly, 12 if payments arc monthly, or 52 if 
payments are weekly; if the payment period is other than monthly, weekly, or quarterly, 
P is the closest whole number resulting from the division of 365 by the number of days 
in the payment period; C is the finance charge; A is the amount financed; N is the 
number of installments in the contract. 
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common, since effective business operations normally require a high 
degree of standardization. In the absence of contrary evidence they 
can be dismissed as an economically insignificant factor. 
With respect to small balance contracts, rate char:ts cannot be 
used in precisely the same manner as they are used in larger trans-
actions. In large transactions the amount financed can be rounded 
off io the nearest ten dollars ·by adjusting the down payment, and 
conceivably the creditor could quote a dollar add-on rate by making 
a simple manual calculation. If, as is usually the case, a chart is used, 
it can give the time rate for each dollar amount. However, in sinall 
transactions the amount of the purchase, including sales taxes, will 
commonly be an odd amount and often will not be rounded off to 
the nearest five or ten dollar amount. If the retailer is required to 
give a time rate for these small purchases, serious problems of feasi-
bility arise. Considering the size of the transaction, it is clearly un-
reasonable to expect the retailer to make a separate manual calcu-
lation for every dollar amount; ~ut if the seller wants to use a chart 
which will give an accurate statement of time rates, he would need 
a chart which takes into account every dollar amount of purchase 
price possible. A chart of this description would be highly cumber-
some, and the economic costs of clerical time and clerical errors 
would undoubtedly be great. Thus, for many merchants this type 
of chart would be completely infeasible. A good example may be 
dra·wn from mail order buying, which is a widespread practice. The 
buyer has access to a catalogue describing the products offered for 
sale and listing the cash price of each. In normal practice the buyer 
may choose several items, which he lists on an order form. He then 
adds the cash prices of the individual items. Suppose the total is $125. 
The buyer is given the opportunity of deferring payment of this 
$125 by signing an installment contract, and is referred to a table 
which indicates that the finance charge on all amounts between 
$120.01 and $130 is $13. He simply adds $13 to the $125 to arrive 
at his total debt of $138. If the law required disclosure of the precise 
time rate in catalogue sales, it would be necessary to have a chart 
detailed to every dollar amount which could possibly be a total pur-
chase price, and such a chart would be very difficult for mail order 
buyers to use. · 
An alternative solution for small retail transactions, whether by 
catalogue or otherwise, is to adapt the charts now in use. Charts 
such as that described with respect to catalogue sales are also used 
in face-to-face retail sales. The chart could indicate the time rate on 
a $120 purchase and the time rate on a $130 purchase. The buyer 
) 
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would then know the range of rates and could estimate what he 
would be paying. In the above example, the range is between 18. 1 
per cent and 15.7 per cent annual interest on the declining balance. 
This range is not very wide and gives a reasonably accurate state-
ment of time rate. 
Even with the use of charts, however, time rate disclosure can be 
given only if the particular transaction is an isolated one. For exam-
ple, a customer buys an item selling for $127 cash. A finance charge 
of $13 is added, and the total of $140 is made payable in fourteen 
monthly payments of $10. The chart indicates that the rate is be-
tween 15.7 per cent and 18.1 per cent. Two months later the same 
customer buys an item selling for $10.75 cash. A finance charge of 
$1.25 is added, and according to the chart the total of $12 is payable 
in four monthly payments of $3. The chart indicates that the rate 
is between 42.6 per cent and 62.4 per cent. But, because it is incon-
venient for both the customer and the store to have several indivi-
dual contracts with different terms outstanding at the same time, 
the two contracts are consolidated; the store informs the customer 
that under the new contract he must pay $11 per month for twelve 
months. The total, $132, is the total of the unpaid balance on the 
first contract, $120, plus the amount of the second purchase, $12. 
The term of the contract is the unexpired term of the longer con-
tract. Thus the effective rate on the second purchase is not between 
42.6 per cent and 62.4 per cent, but is actually 21.5 per centl 
Where revolving credit is not used, such consolidation of time 
sale contracts is common practice. It is of great benefit to the con-
sumer, since he makes one payment instead of several without any 
increase in his finance charge. However, as the above example shows, 
the effective rate can change very substantially. The example also 
points up the fact that the $1.25 is a service charge primarily de-
signed to cover the cost of handling the transaction. The term over 
'which the finance charge is payable greatly affects the time rate, but 
the length of this term is determined fortuitously by the term of the 
outstanding contract with the customer. Neither the 21.5 per cent or 
the 42.6 per cent to 62.4 per cent figure is very significant; however, 
the $1.25 figure is highly significant. 
Whenever a purchase is to be consolidated with previous debts 
owed by the customer, time rate disclosure by the salesman is not 
feasible, since he needs information concerning the outstanding debt 
which he normally will not have. Even if he had this information, 
a salesman would not normally be expected to spend his time mak-
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ing the required calculations. A central record office ordinarily 
would be consulted to provide the information. With respect to 
large transactions, it might be economical to get the information for 
the purpose of precontract disclosure, but it certainly is not eco-
nomical in the case of small transactions. Of course, precontract 
time rate disclosure would be impossible with respect to such trans-
actions as mail order sales; the most that could be required, in such 
a case would be that the purchaser be informed, after the contract 
is in effect, of the effective rate. 
IV. TRANSACTIONS IN WHICH TIME RATE 
DIScLosuRE Is DESIRABLE 
Having examined the different functions of disclosure of finance 
charges and the feasibility of making time rate disclosure in various 
transactions, we shall relate function to feasibility and evaluate the 
desirability of the various methods of finance charge disclosure. It is 
our thesis that disclosure of :finance charges is not an end in itself; 
rather, legal requirement of disclosure by any method must be jus-
tified on the ground that it performs some useful function. How 
finance charges should be disclosed and in what transactions disclo-
sure should be required are questions that must be solved by bal-
ancing the benefit to the consumer against the cost to the creditor. 
There are three methods of disclosure: in terms of total dollar 
amount of the finance charge, in terms of periodic dollar payment, 
and the expression of the finance charge as a time rate. We believe 
that, with the exception of very long-term debt, the consumer should 
be told the total dollar cost of the credit in all transactions in which 
such disclosure is possible.82 In most instances information about the 
dollar amount best performs the descriptive function of finance 
charge disclosure. Except in open-end credit transactions, such as re-
volving credit, it is feasible for the creditor to supply dollar disclo-
sure at the inception of the transaction. In open-end credit, periodic 
disclosure of dollar amount of finance charges can be made after 
debts are incurred. Disclosure of the amount and number of periodic 
payments has long been regarded as a minimal standard with respect 
to consumer credit transactions and should be required in every situ-
ation in which it is feasible. 
The remaining question concerns the desirability of time rate 
disclosure. In the section on feasibility it was concluded that it is not 
possible for a creditor to make time rate disclosure in open-end 
32. Such a requirement is contained in § 4 of the Douglas Bill, S. 2275. 
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credit transactions.83 It was also concluded that in closed-end credit 
transactions it is possible for a creditor to give time rate disclosure 
whenever the amount of the credit, the amount of the finance charge, 
and the time and amount of the payments are known. Furthermore, 
by use of charts it is feasible to make time rate disclosure in all 
closed-end credit transactions except small retail sales if (1) an ap-
proximation rather than an exact rate is acceptable, and (2) the con-
tract is a reasonably regular one. In small retail transactions, how-
ever, the feasibility of disclosing finance charges by time rate is 
questionable. As was suggested in the previous section, in cases in-
volving small, odd-dollar retail sales, time rate disclosure can, as a 
practical matter, be given only in terms of a range of time rates cov-
ering a spread of different dollar amounts. Disclosure of rate by 
range of dollar amounts gives a reasonably accurate approximation 
of how much is being charged if the transaction is an isolated one. 
Ordinary sales clerks could be trained to use the necessary charts, 
which appear to be no more difficult to use than a sales tax chart. 
However, if the transaction is not isolated but is to be consolidated 
with existing debt, meaningful time rate disclosure cannot economi-
cally be made before the contract is signed. It is pointless to require 
disclosure of a rate that may not bear any relation to the true rate. 
Furthermore, to require the calculations necessary to arrive at a rea-
sonably accurate rate in a non-isolated small transaction would im-
pose inconvenience and serious economic cost upon both seller and 
buyer. To appraise fully whether imposition of these additional eco-
nomic costs is justified, the question whether time rate disclosure 
serves a significant purpose in small transactions should be considered. 
In the section on the function of disclosure of finance charges, 
it was concluded that time rate disclosure does indeed further the 
major function, that is, credit shopping. Our analysis leads to the 
conclusion that in those transactions in which shopping for credit 
as such is possible, such as auto sales, time rate disclosure contributes 
33. The current version of the Douglas Bill, S. 2275, requires time rate disclosure in 
open-end credit transactions. Section 4(b) provides that in open-end credit transactions 
the creditor shall "(I) Furnish to such person, prior to agreeing to extend credit under 
such plan, a clear statement in writing setting forth the simple annual percentage rate 
or rates at which a finance charge will be imposed on the monthly balance; and 
(2) furnish to such person, at the end of each monthly period ••• a clear statement in 
writing setting forth to the extent applicable and ascertainable ••• the simple annual 
percentage rate or rates at which a finance charge has been imposed on the monthly 
balance." The September 25, 1964, Committee Print of S. 750 included amendments to 
the original version of the bill that abrogated the requirement of time rate disclosure 
in open-end credit transactions. In deleting these r.mendments, Senator Douglas in 
S. 2275 has gone back to his original across-the-board requirement of annual percentage 
disclosure. • 
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to improving the consumer's ability to shop more wisely. Not only 
does time rate disclosure allow the credit shopper to compare the 
rates of the different major segments of the finance industry (banks, 
credit unions, sales finance companies, small loan companies, and 
retailers), but also allows him to evaluate more accurately which 
companies within the different institutional segments offer the most 
attractive deal. We believe that credit shopping is possible with re-
spect to virtually all sizes of loan transactions and with respect to 
large retail sales. , 
In the smaller retail sales, we doubt that time rate disclosure 
serves any beneficial function for the consumer; in such transactions 
it might even be detrimental to consumers. It was indicated in a 
previous section that the likelihood of consumers shopping for credit 
. as such in small retail transactions is questionable. A purchaser buy-
ing a $30 bicycle on credit is more likely to compare the total dollar 
cost of the transaction, such as $35, with that offered by competing 
retailers than he is to consider whether he could borrow the $30 
more cheaply at a bank or small loan company. Such an approach is 
reasonable, for another retailer may be offering a comparable bi-
cycle for $27 with a $6 :finance charge. In the small retail sale, the 
buyer is understandably more interested in shopping with respect 
to variation in the quality and price of the goods than he is with 
respect to the amount of the :finance charge imposed. 
In fact, there is some danger in encouraging consumers to over-
emphasize the finance charge element of the total credit price of 
goods in retail sales. The allocation by a credit seller of the total 
credit price of goods between cash price and finance charge can be 
quite arbitrary, particularly if credit sales make up a large part of 
the seller's business. The bicycle seller can price the article at $30 
with a $5 finance charge, or he can "bury" the :finance charge in the 
cash price and. quote a $33 cash price and a $2 :finance charge. In 
the second case, the credit seller can quote the buyer a dramatically 
lower time rate than in the first case. If retail consumers are taught 
to seek out the lowest time rate, sellers will be encouraged to com-
pete on what may be a completely arbitrary and meaningless basis-
the amount and time rate of the finance charge. To the extent that 
retailers compete by burying the finance charge in the cash price, 
the cash consumer must subsidize the credit consumer. 
Another factor pointing to the futility of requiring time rate 
disclosure in small retail transactions is the limited number of cases 
in which accurate rates could be given. We have discussed the diffi-
culties caused by consolidated contracts. Moreover, there has been a 
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sharp increase in the use of open-end credit in the small sales area. 
A department store may sell a $30 chair on the traditional title-
retention contract, or it may add the sale to the buyer's revolving 
credit account; the store will base its choice as between the two meth• 
ods upon such factors as the desire of the buyer, the total amount 
financed, the amount of the monthly payments, and the nature of 
the goods. We have postulated that there is no method of making 
accurate time rate disclosure of finance charges in revolving credit 
transactions. In fact, even dollar amount disclosure cannot be made 
on a precontract basis. Hence, time rate disclosure in closed-end 
credit situations gives the buyer little assistance in comparing these 
finance costs with those in open-end credit situations. It is somewhat 
ironical that over the decade in which the controversy over the Doug• 
las Bill has raged, the actual importance of percentage disclosure has 
probably diminished because of the strong trend toward revolving 
credit. It is almost inevitable that credit cards, a form of revolving 
credit, will become the standard method of financing all but larger 
credit purchases. As the revolving credit volume continues to expand 
in retail sales at the expense of closed-end credit, time rate disclo-
sure in the latter becomes less useful for credit shopping purposes. 
Any disclosure requirements which make the use of closed-end credit 
more onerous to the retailer will simply accelerate the trend toward 
revolving credit. 
There are other arguments against requiring time rate disclosure 
in these transactions. In small balance, short term credit transac-
tions, whether sale or loan, the finance charge must necessarily con-
tain a large service charge component. It costs almost as much to 
process and service a $50 credit extension as a $500 one. Hence, for 
the creditor to deal in small credit transactions at a profit, he must 
charge nearly as much for giving the $50 credit as the larger one. 
This results in comparatively high finance charge rates on small 
sales and loans. La·wmakers have recognized this economic fact by 
allowing sellers to impose minimum finance charges on retail sales 
and by prescribing graduated rate ceilings on both sale and loan 
credit charges.34 The question we pose is whether quoting to a con-
sumer a very high time rate in small credit transactions materially 
assists in his credit shopping. 
Suppose a buyer purchases a $20 fan in a state which allows the 
34. See CURRAN 270-77 (chart 13), indicating that in "all goods" retail installment 
sale statutes, finance charge minima run from $5 to $20, with several statutes allowing 
$10 to $12 charges. 
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seller to impose a $10 minimum charge in all credit sales of goods.sis 
If the contract called for repayment of the balance of $30 in weekly 
payments of one dollar, the time rate calculated by the constant 
ratio method would be 168 per cent per annum. In setting the mini-
mum charge, the state legislature recognized that it costs the seller 
at least $10 to sell any item on installment credit. Yet when this 
charge is expressed as a time rate, the buyer will conclude that 
he is being outrageously overcharged. The customer's reaction is 
probably due to the fact that time rates have traditionally been 
used to describe the cost of money, and consumers compare any 
time rate with the cost of money in other familiar transactions, 
such as real estate loans or savings deposits (the "six per cent myth"). 
A time rate is not a good way to describe the price of services; here 
dollar amounts are traditional. Thus in cases in which the finance 
charge is made up mostly of service charges, time rate disclosure 
becomes largely meaningless. The service charge distortion is also 
present in small loan transactions, but since the commercial small 
loan is rarely under $100 and is usually much higher than that, this 
service charge problem is not as great in such transactions. 
It is significant that in larger transactions a creditor will have 
a "rate of the house"; for example, he may finance all new car sales 
at six dollars per hundred per annum. He will often advertise this 
rate and will work from this rate to determine the finance charge 
in each case. On the other hand, in t.qe small retail sale situation, 
the seller will decide how much it costs him to make a credit sale 
at a given price level, and he will then set a finance charge in dollars 
to cover this cost. Dollar disclosure alone more clearly describes the 
amount of the charge. 
Some might say that time rate disclosure is most important with 
respect to the small transaction in which the time rate would be 
high, on the theory that one function of disclosure is to shock the 
consumer into realizing how much he must pay for credit. They 
would argue that if people realized how much credit . costs they 
would use it less frequently, and therefore overcommitment would 
become a smaller problem for credit consumers. Even assuming that 
the desired effect is obtainable, this view seems indefensible if the 
shock results from misleading figures. Moreover, if the Government 
wishes to contract consumer credit, there are more direct methods 
of doing so; the "Regulation W" approach of increasing low pay-
35. California, for example, would allow a $10 minimum charge in this case, so long 
as the term of the credit is less than eight months. If the term were more than eight 
months, $12 would be the highest permissible minimum charge. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1805.1. 
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ment requirements and shortening maturities is the best example.86 
Furthermore, it is doubtful that time rate disclosure, even in the 
small transactions in which rates would appear to be very large, 
would have any lasting effect in reducing credit extensions. In the 
very month in which manufacturers first printed the legend "Cau-
tion: Cigarette smoking may be hazardous to your health" on ciga-
rette packages there was an increase in cigarette consumption in 
the United States.37 
Our conclusion is that there should be no requirement of time 
rate disclosure in open-end credit or small retail sales transactions. 
It has been shown that time rate disclosure is impossible in open-
end credit situations, and there are serious questions both as to the 
economic cost of requiring time rate disclosure and the desirability 
of doing so with respect to small retail sales. It is difficult to draw 
a line bet\veen large and small transactions. The division must nec-
essarily depend on somewhat arbitrary assumptions concerning the 
level at which credit shopping is potentially effective. A figure in 
the range of $200 to $300 is probably defensible.38 No doubt there 
is some degree of credit shopping going on amongst all but the most 
necessitous borrowers in the loan credit area. Time rate disclosure 
to the necessitous borrower is a neutral factor; he is neither helped 
nor harmed by it. Presumably the ease of giving time rate disclo-
sure in the small loan transaction is greater than in the small retail 
sale. In all other areas of consumer credit, time rate disclosure would 
give the consumer benefits that would at least justify the cost to 
creditors of supplying the additional information. Such disclosure 
should be given before the consumer enters into the credit transac-
tion if precontract disclosure is at all feasible. It should be recog-
nized, however, that in some areas, such as catalogue selling and 
the consolidation of retail contracts, only post-contract disclosure 
may be possible. To the extent that retailers rely on repeat business 
or continuing relationships with customers, post-contract disclosure 
may be effective. 
36. Regulation W was imposed during wartime by the federal government to control 
the volume of consumer credit. See MoRS 46. 
37. Los Angeles Times, March 30, 1966, pt. I, p. 18, col. 3. 
38. A useful starting point for fixing the dividing line between large and small 
transactions might be the level at which the general ceiling rate rather than minimum 
charges sets the finance charge ceiling. For example, the California Retail Installment 
Sales Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1805.1, provides for an add-on rate of ten dollars per 
hundred per year (% of 1 % per $100 per month) for credits of $1,000 or less. The 
minimum charges are $10 for a contract of 8 months or less and $12 for contracts of 
over 8 months. For contracts of just over 8 months, the general ceiling rate of ten 
dollars per hundred will apply for credits of $180 and more. 
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If time rate disclosure is to be required in many common credit 
transactions, the question arises whether it should be stated in terms 
of an annual percentage rate (as the Douglas Bill requires), a 
monthly percentage rate, or as dollars per hundred per year. Any of 
the three methods would be adequate to afford the consumer a. 
method of comparing credit costs. A sociologist recently concluded: 
There has been considerable dispute on the "best" way of 
formulating the costs of consumer credit, and it has been thought 
that some psychological experiment might help solve the prob-
lem. To some extent this is true, but on reflection, the main 
problems must lie elsewhere. The competing formulations are 
not too different and the trouble is not so much that each could 
be better, but that there are so many different ones abroad. If 
there were only one formula, no matter which one were chosen 
-although one should strive for the best one-there would be 
no problem. As time went on, everybody who cared could under-
stand its meaning. Thus, standardization more than choice of a 
"best" formula might be the most valuable contribution.39 
Our preference would be for an annual time rate, but, as be-
tween dollars per hundred and annual interest, we see little basis 
for choice.40 Dollars per hundred is the common method of comput-
ing and advertising finance charges in the whole range- of retail 
credit transactions. There is no uniform method used in loan credit 
contracts. However, credit life insurance and credit accident and 
health insurance rates are commonly stated in terms of dollars per 
hundred. Thus if finance charges were stated in terms of dollars per 
hundred, credit insurance charges could be similarly stated on the 
contract, allowing the consumer to see the relationship between the 
two; he could learn the total cost of credit expressed as a time rate 
by merely adding the two figures together. For example, if the 
finance charge is expressed as eight dollars per hundred per year and 
the credit insurance charge is expressed as two dollars per hundred 
per year, the consumer can add the two amounts to obtain the time 
rate of ten dollars per hundred per year. On the other hand, it can 
be said that the time rate should be expressed in terms of annual 
interest because this method would allow the consumer to make a 
39. Memorandum prepared by Professor Hans Zeise!, of the University of Chicago 
School of Law, for the use of the Consumer Credit Project of the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 
40. It is here assumed that a workable definition of "finance charges" can be drafted. 
It should be noted in passing that § 3(3) of the Douglas Bill has been severely criticized 
for its vague, all-encompassing definition of finance charge. See Hearings on S. 2275 
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th 
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1063 (1964) (remarks of Mr. Walter D. Malcolm). 
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more meaningful comparison between the return to him on his 
savings and the cost of consumer credit. This would help the con-
sumer who has savings to decide whether to use credit or to wjth-
draw his savings and pay cash, but the number of people who look 
. to savings as an alternative source for financing consumer purchases 
is probably very limited. 
V. DISCLOSURE IN CONTEXT 
It has often been observed that one of the principal social evils 
in consumer credit is the financial overcommitment to which many 
consumers are led. The man who is burdened with debts and 
hounded by creditors presents a substantial social problem. The 
hearings on the Douglas Bill indicate that the problem is widespread. 
However, it is extremely doubtful that time rate disclosure of finance 
charges represents a significant answer to the problem. 
The concept of time rate disclosure is in the mainstream of 
previous legislative approaches to the problems of the consumer. 
Existing statutes in many cases closely regulate the content of the 
contract between creditor and consumer. Under these statutes 
the consumer is typically given very detailed information about the 
transaction: he is warned in large type to read the contract before 
he signs; he is advised not to sign if the contract has blank spaces; 
and he is told what legal rights he possesses in a wide variety of situ-
ations in which he might find himself. Still he is frequently cheated. 
The simple truth is that for a very large percentage of consumers, 
contract disclosure is meaningless. Selling is not normally done in 
the contract. The consumer is sold before he ever signs the contract 
and he seldom reads it before or after he signs. This is not an argu-
ment against either time rate disclosure or existing state disclosure 
statutes; disclosure legislation can be very useful to some consumers 
-those who read contracts-and it may even be of some value to 
those who do not read them. If high rate creditors are forced to dis-
close their charges in a graphic way it is more likely that their prac-
tices will become generally known. However, it is well to point out 
that whatever the benefits of disclosure may be, other action might 
be of much greater significance in helping the consumer. We are fear-
ful that in the great emphasis which many have placed upon time 
rate disclosure, the limitations on disclosure as a protective device 
have been overlooked. 
Disclosure statutes follow the traditional pattern; they constitute 
an attempt to equalize the struggle between consumer and creditor 
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by giving the consumer certain weapons. The theory is that if the 
consumer is given all relevant information and an array of legal 
rights he can then do battle with the creditor. This approach simply 
has not worked in many cases. 
Our experience indicates that the principal victim of the defi-
ciencies in the consumer credit system is the person who gets too far 
into debt, who receives poor quality goods or services, or who pays 
too much for the product he receives. All too often all three elements 
are present at the same time when the buyer becomes involved with 
a disreputable seller. Typically the victim is unsophisticated, unedu-
cated, and foolish. He is often the person who is least able to benefit 
from detailed disclosure provisions. His problem is not one of credit 
charges but rather of credit itself. The use of credit makes it possible 
for someone to sell him goods and services which he would never 
buy for cash. Rarely is he cheated because he is overcharged for the 
credit itself; indeed, he often buys from a merchant who makes "no 
charge for credit." 
If the marginal consumer cannot be relied upon to avoid bad 
bargains, a more fruitful approach may be to take away from the 
creditor some of the weapons that make it possible for him to profit 
at the expense of the unwary. Frequently an unscrupulous merchant 
will sell shoddy goods which are greatly overpriced. Normally title 
is retained by the seller. If the buyer misses a payment or wants to 
withhold a payment because the goods are unsatisfactory, he is faced 
with the threat of repossession. If the creditor repossesses he may sell 
the goods, perhaps to himself, at a small fraction of their original 
price. He may then get a judgment against the original buyer for the 
unpaid purchase price plus the expenses of the repossession and his 
attorney's fee. To collect his judgment the creditor may then garnish . 
the buyer's wages, and an employee whose wages are garnished fre-
quently loses his job. The buyer faced with the prospect of losing 
what he has already paid on the goods, the goods. themselves, and per-
haps his job, is more likely to pay the creditor even if it is an unjust 
debt and even if payment means sacrifice of necessaries for his family. 
Furthermore, the unavailability of legal assistance in cases of this 
kind leaves the buyer with many rights that go unvindicated. 
Creditors have many weapons available to them for bringing 
debtors to heel, and courts of law serve as inexpensive and efficient 
collection agencies. Thus the unscrupulous may find it profitable to 
sell to the consumer who cannot afford to pay. However, if some of 
these weapons are taken from the creditor he may be encouraged to 
ration credit. For example, if the creditor is not allowed to get a de-
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:ficiency judgment or, what is more important, if he is not allowed 
to garnish the wages of someone earning no more than a living wage, 
it is more difficult for him to victimize the buyer. He will have to 
rely upon larger do-wn payments and upon collateral to secure the 
unpaid balance. 
It is frequently the case that victimization of consumers is done 
by creditors who make a regular practice of illegal or unconscionable 
behavior, relying upon the default judgment, and the inability of 
some consumers to assert legal rights, in order to maintain their 
operations. By means of effective administrative remedies designed 
to force creditors to desist from such practices, many of the more 
outrageous credit practices could be stopped. 
The disclosure of :finance charges on a rational basis is an impor-
tant element of consumer protection, and we have sought to give a 
balanced analysis of the function which it can serve. However, we 
would like to close with the observation that little may be gained 
from disclosure legislation unless it is coupled with effective provi-
sions for protection of the consumer in the area of creditors' reme-
dies and effective policing by public officials of unconscionable cred-
itor practices. 
